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The Role of Hybrid Pension Plans in an Aging Population  
 
Richard W. Johnson and Eugene Steuerle 
 
Introduction 
The world of retirement plans has changed dramatically since the early 1970s.  Defined 
contribution (DC) plans have now supplanted the defined benefit (DB) format as the most 
common type of retirement plan, in terms of number of participants and value of assets, while 
hybrid pension plans, including cash balance and pension equity plans, have transformed the DB 
universe.  Although these changes partly represent reactions to tax laws and new conventions 
among employers perhaps looking to save money, broader economic forces are also clearly at 
play.  Demographic shifts, reflected in the aging of the population, stand out. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, when the nation’s labor force was growing rapidly, many 
employers used their pension plans to encourage workers to retire early.  Traditional DB plans 
typically provide lifetime annuities paid in monthly installments that depend on years of service 
and salary earned near the end of the career.  The size of the monthly benefit increases with years 
of service, but plan participants lose a year of payments for each additional year of work beyond 
the age at which they can first collect benefits.  Because the increase in benefits paid in each 
installment is often insufficient to offset the reduction in the number of installments, many 
workers in DB plans lose pension wealth by delaying retirement.  DB plans also often include 
early retirement provisions, which further discourage work at older ages by subsidizing benefits 
for those who retire early, often as young as age 55.  
Although many workers remain productive at older ages but retire with many years of life 
expectancy remaining, employers still used to argue that the retirement incentives in traditional 
DB plans enabled them to make room for the large numbers of young workers entering the labor 
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force each year without resorting to layoffs or wage cuts for older workers, which can destroy 
employee morale.  In addition, seniority pay systems often ended up compensating some older 
workers more than they were worth in productive output, making the retirement incentives in DB 
plans even more appealing to employers.  
Employers were able to let productive workers go because the influx of women and 
young baby boomers into the workforce created an ample supply of labor.  Today, however, as 
the relative size of the younger population falls, employers confront potential worker shortages 
and are reluctant to lose their skilled workers to retirement.  Meanwhile, pension costs for 
traditional DB plans have risen over the past few decades, after adjusting for stock market 
gyrations, because retirees are now living and collecting benefits longer than they did in the past.  
The growing popularity of hybrid pension plans represents one response to the changing 
demographics of the labor market.  As in DC plans, which are typically tax-deferred retirement 
accounts into which both employers and employees contribute, hybrid plans express future 
retirement benefits as account balances.  In cash balance plans, employers set aside a percentage 
of each employee’s salary each period, which earns interest at a set rate.  Balances in pension 
equity plans equal a given percentage of final average earnings for each year of service.  Because 
these account balances continue to grow at about the same rate after the retirement age as they 
did beforehand, DC and hybrid plans generally do not discourage workers from remaining on the 
job at older ages.  By shifting from traditional plans to hybrid plans (or never adopting DB plans, 
which is standard practice for new firms), employers may be better able to retain their older 
workers and hire new workers of any age.  
These shifts are not without controversy.  Employers may change plans to reduce pension 
costs, especially when they drop early retirement incentives.  Whether this saving accrues 
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primarily to workers or owners of the company depends greatly upon whether the shift raises 
compensation costs or profits, and whether workers are able to demand that their total 
compensation, regardless of pension plan design, reflects their overall productivity.  Even if 
pension costs do not fall, some workers will lose out when changes in pension format spread 
benefits more evenly among all age groups.  In many traditional DB plans, 50-year-olds receive 
large increases in lifetime pension benefits in return for an additional year of work, but 65-year-
olds receive next to nothing.  Converting to a different format, such as a cash balance plan, that 
increases pension wealth by a moderate amount for both groups could generate opposition from 
those planning to retire early.  
This private transformation of retirement policy may indirectly support national 
retirement policy objectives.  With the aging of the population, there is increasing concern about 
the ability of workers to pay enough taxes to support future retirees and other government 
functions.  Moreover, the vast majority of today’s retirees depend more on Social Security and 
Medicare than their own saving (Gustman et al., 1999), yet they spend close to one-third of their 
adult lives in retirement.  By instead working and saving for a few more years, they can do much 
to reduce this level of dependency.  
More importantly, if current employment patterns persist, fewer workers producing fewer 
goods and services can threaten standards of living for Americans of all ages—or at least the rate 
at which those standards rise.  By promoting work at older ages, conversion to hybrid pension 
plans and other initiatives may increase the labor pool and relieve some of the demographic 
pressures on public programs caused by population aging.  Put another way, people who work an 
extra year produce goods and services that can support their own current consumption and help 
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cover the costs of both retirement programs and other government efforts (such as defense) while 
at the same time reducing tax pressures on younger workers to support them in retirement.  
This paper examines the growth in hybrid pension plans within the context of the 
changing labor market.  The next section documents how population aging is transforming the 
labor market and how the labor force will likely change in the near future if current participation 
rates persist.  The paper then considers how improvements over time in health status and declines 
in the physical demands of work increase work capacity at older ages.  Section IV examines how 
retirement incentives differ between hybrid plans and traditional DB plans, and section V offers 
conclusions.  
The Changing Demographics of the Labor Market 
People are now living longer and having fewer children.  Between 1950 and 2001, the 
U.S. fertility rate (defined as the ratio of births to women aged 15 to 44) declined from 106 to 65 
(Hamilton, Martin, and Sutton, 2003; U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, 1999), while life 
expectancy at birth increased from 68 years to 77 years (Arias and Smith, 2003; U.S. National 
Center for Health Statistics, 2002).  These trends have combined to increase the average age of 
the U.S. population.  Between 1950 and 2000, the share of the adult population aged 65 and 
older increased from 12 percent to 17 percent (see Figure 1), and Census projections indicate that 
this share will grow even more rapidly over the next 50 years, rising to 27 percent in 2050.  In 
addition, the oldest old population, which is most likely to need costly supportive services such 
as nursing home care, will soar in the coming decades, with the number of people ages 85 and 
older rising from 2 percent of the adult population in 2000 to 6 percent in 2050.  Meanwhile, the 
total number of adults under the age of 55, who traditionally dominated the nation’s workforce, 
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will remain virtually unchanged between now and 2020, even though the overall population will 
grow by 44 million, according to Census projections (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002a, 2002b). 
Figure 1 here 
The aging of the baby boom, the generation born in the 20 years after the end of World 
War II, is accelerating long-term changes in the age distribution of the population that would 
have occurred even if this cohort were not so large.  The surge of births in the 1950s and 1960s 
masked the long-term decline in fertility that began more than 100 years ago, delaying the 
relative rise in the elderly population by a couple of generations.  As the baby boomers now 
approach retirement, however, they will force the economy to adjust to the presence of a large 
older population within about a single generation.  Without the baby boom, this process might 
have taken three generations.   
As the age distribution changes, the number of younger adults per older adult in the 
population will continue to plummet.  Since 1950, for example, the ratio of adults between the 
ages of 18 and 64 to adults ages 65 and older fell from 7.5 to 5.0, and will decline further to 2.8 
by 2050.  If workers continue to retire at about the same age as they do now, in 50 years there 
will be only about half as many workers as there are today to pay the cost of Social Security, 
Medicare, and other benefits received by each older adult.  Barring a surge in productivity, the 
relative growth in the size of the dependent population will mean fewer benefits for older adults, 
higher taxes for younger adults, or both.  
Labor Force Participation Rates.  But changes in population tell only part of the story.  What 
really matters for total economic output, and the burden of supporting the older population, is the 
number of workers in the economy relative to those who will be supported, which in turn 
depends on individual decisions about work.  Society could limit the burden of old age support 
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by gradually redefining old age according to life expectancy, implying that people in their 60s 
today and in the 21st century may indeed be middle-aged.  According to data from Social 
Security’s actuaries, 75-year-olds in 2050 can expect to survive another 12.6 years on average, 
about as long as 65-year-olds lived in 1940, when Social Security began.  By delaying retirement 
and deferring old age benefits until later in life, Americans can offset the demographic pressures 
created by living longer and having fewer children.  
Until recently, labor force participation rates for men have been declining steadily, 
particularly at older ages (see Figure 2).  Almost three-quarters of men ages 55 to 74 worked in 
1950, compared with just under half in 2000.  Nonetheless, there are encouraging signs that the 
decline in participation rates has ended and may have even reversed.  For example, between 
1995 and 2003, employment rates among men ages 62 to 64 increased from 42 percent to 47 
percent (Purcell, 2003).  Employment rates among men ages 55 to 61 did not increase over the 
period, however.  
Figure 2 here 
Labor supply patterns are very different for women, of course, who entered the labor 
force in large numbers over the past 50 years.  Labor force participation rates for women ages 25 
to 54 more than doubled between 1950 and 2000, to 76 percent, and women are now almost as 
likely as men in this age group to work.  The movement of women into the labor force has offset 
the decline in male participation and maintained the overall size of the labor pool.  In fact, labor 
force participation rates among all adults increased in almost every non-recession year since 
1950 (Steuerle and Carasso, 2001; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003a).  But it is unlikely that 
participation rates among young and middle-aged women—which are already close to male 
participation rates—will rise much higher in coming years, especially given the childcare 
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responsibilities that many women face.  Participation rates among older women will probably 
increase in the near term, however, as later generations of women who are accustomed to paid 
employment reach old age and replace earlier generations who worked less outside the home.  
For example, employment among women ages 55 to 61 rose from 54 percent in 1995 to 61 
percent in 2003 (Purcell, 2003). 
Projecting Future Participation Rates.  Many economic and demographic forecasters use these 
data to predict future labor force participation rates by age and sex according to past patterns.  
Although the decline in labor supply at older ages appears to have stopped, the reversal so far is 
small enough that most projections assume that workers in the future will retire at about the same 
age as they do today.  Some economists believe that even this assumption is too optimistic and 
that the long-term trend toward earlier retirement will continue indefinitely, because people tend 
to demand more leisure when their wealth rises (Costa, 1998).  According to this view, as long as 
economic growth continues to raise per-capita income and people take leisure time in the form of 
retirement, employment at older ages will continue to fall. 
The assumption that 2000 work patterns persist into the future implies that the share of 
adults in the labor force will drop over the next 50 years as the nation ages (see Figure 3).  
According to these projections, the labor force participation rate for women will begin to fall by 
2010, and the rate in 2050 for all adults ages 20 and older will fall back to its 1950 level, down 8 
percentage points from 2000. 
Figure 3 here 
These declines in labor force participation rates would reduce the 10-year growth rate in 
the size of the labor force to less than 4 percent between 2010 and 2020, down from 12 percent 
between 1990 and 2000.  Figure 4 shows how declines in the growth rate of the labor force 
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reduce the number of workers per non-working adult ages 65 and older.  Between 2000 and 
2030, the ratio falls from 4.5 to 2.6, assuming 2000 work patterns persist into the future.  And 
this analysis ignores the fact that most people begin collecting Social Security at age 62, not age 
65. 
Figure 4 here 
An essentially stagnant labor pool would significantly strain both the economy and 
government budget.  The decline in labor force growth would in turn reduce economic growth 
and increase the probability of a recession, all else equal, although slower labor force growth is 
certainly not enough by itself to eliminate all or even most economic progress.  Productivity will 
rise and economic growth will continue as long as the nation continues to invest in physical 
capital and education and other types of human capital. 
The federal budget, of course, is already on an unsustainable course.  A balanced budget 
that maintains current tax policies and promises to the elderly, while reducing defense and 
international expenditures only moderately, would leave nothing – absolutely nothing – for any 
other government functions by 2011 (Steuerle, forthcoming).  All other government services, 
ranging from children’s programs to community development to energy to transportation to 
income assistance, would face elimination.  The aging of the population would make the 
situation even worse after 2011.   
We do not, however, expect this situation to continue.  Paraphrasing Herbert Stein, “what 
can’t continue, won’t.”  One solution for government programs is to elicit more years of work 
from individuals, rather than subsidizing them to retire with so many years of life remaining.  
Policymakers could raise the retirement age for Social Security or lower the level of retirement 
benefits relative to past wages, as the recent President’s Commission to Strengthen Social 
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Security (2001) recommended.  In fact, although there is fierce disagreement on the size of the 
change, almost all proposals from conservatives, liberals, and any retirement commission put 
together in recent years would reduce at least somewhat the replacement rate in Social Security, 
thus encouraging work at older ages.  Congress also recently eliminated the earnings test in 
Social Security, and reforms enacted back in 1983 have been gradually raising the “normal” 
retirement age in recent years.  But if changes to public policy are to elicit more years of work, 
and if workers are going to seek more employment later in life to maintain higher replacement 
rates in retirement, private retirement systems are going to have to adjust to accommodate these 
additional workers.  
Even if government does not respond further – an almost impossible assumption, given 
the projections – we do not believe that future labor force participation rates will be as low as the 
simple forecasts suggest.  For one thing, it is misleading to measure leisure simply as time spent 
outside the labor market.  Workers do not have to retire to enjoy leisure and a more relaxed 
lifestyle; they can remain employed but take more vacation time, engage in more stimulating 
work, or simply find better working conditions.  Thus we do not believe the argument that higher 
standards of living inexorably lead to more years of retirement.  Until very recently in human 
history, most people did not retire at all.   
Another perhaps more important problem with many of today’s simple forecasts of labor 
supply is that they ignore the demand for labor.  For example, they tend to treat the entry of 
women into the labor force as a sociological phenomenon arising from the development of more 
equal rights for women and technological improvements in home production.  In fact, 
employment rates arise from the interaction of labor supply with labor demand, which derives 
from the public’s desire for goods and services.  The movement of younger and then middle-
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aged women into the labor force over the past 30 years allowed older workers to retire at 
relatively younger ages without slowing the growth of the labor force or upsetting the 
equilibrium of the labor market.  If women and other groups (such as immigrants) are unable to 
fill the shortfall in labor created by early retirement, then workers will likely end up staying in 
the labor force for more years.  The invisible hand of the market will raise compensation (wages 
and benefits) to draw just enough workers into the labor force to allow supply to meet demand.  
Because the demand for goods and services (and hence labor) is related to the size of the 
population, predicting future labor force participation as a share of the total population, instead 
of separately by age and sex, might generate more reliable forecasts of the future size of the 
workforce (Steuerle and Carasso, 2001).  By the same token, much depends upon the speed of 
institutional reaction, especially public and private retirement policy. 
Who will supply the labor necessary to meet the demand for goods and services over the 
next 50 years?  Under the standard age-sex based labor supply projections that assume roughly 
that 2000 patterns persist into the future, people over the age of 55 will make up more than two-
thirds of adults outside the labor force by 2050.  And more than one-third, or 47 million, will be 
between the ages of 55 and 74 (see Figure 5).  Like women in the past generation, older adults 
represent a huge source of potential labor in what is now the very near future.  
Figure 5 here 
The world of work will look very different if older adults resume working at levels that 
prevailed in the not too distant past.  Figure 6, for instance, shows projected differences in 2020 
in the number of workers per nonworking adult aged 65 and older, depending upon the labor 
force participation rates of men.  If all men and women continue to work at the same rate as they 
did in 2000, then the ratio will drop from 4.5 in 2000 to 3.3 in 2020.  However, if men ages 55 
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and older begin to participate at the rate they participated in 1960 (and everyone else continues to 
participate at their 2000 rates), then the ratio in 2020 will rise back to about 3.8 – not enough to 
solve the old age crisis, but enough to make the problem significantly more manageable.  
Moreover, this calculation does not account for increases in longevity.  It may be more 
appropriate to compare labor supply for a 65-year-old man in 2020 and a 60-year-old man in 
1950, because both men would have about the same remaining years of life expectancy.  
Figure 6 here 
Changes in the Ability to Work at Older Ages 
Admittedly, the recent trend toward more work at later ages is so new that we cannot 
prove that it will continue.  But we can address the question of whether people are capable of 
work at ages at which most workers today have already retired, such as 62, 65, and 70.  Do poor 
health and the physical demands of work really require them to spend the last third of their lives 
in retirement?   
There is considerable evidence that adults between the ages of 55 and 75 are better able 
to work today than they were in the past, because health status has improved over time and the 
physical demands of work have declined.  On the basis of life expectancy alone, for instance, it is 
unclear that these adults should even be called old.  For instance, classifying people as old only if 
they have on average no more than 10 years of remaining life expectancy would place 75-year-
olds in late middle age today; among those born in 1938 (who reach age 65 in 2003), old age 
would not begin until age 76 for men and age 80 for women (Social Security Administration, 
2003a, 2003b).  
Increases in life expectancy have been accompanied by improvements in health at middle 
age and beyond over at least the past 25 years (Crimmins, Reynolds, and Saito, 1999; Manton 
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and Gu, 2001), and perhaps much longer (Costa, 2002).  Figure 7, for example, shows that the 
share of adults ages 55 to 64 and ages 65 to 74 describing themselves as being in poor or fair 
health (as opposed to good, very good, or excellent health) declined steadily from 1982 to 2001.  
Although self-reports of health status are not perfect, they do appear to contain a substantial 
amount of information, and are strong predictors of mortality (Idler and Benyamini, 1997).   The 
decline in the share reporting fair or poor health has been especially pronounced at ages 65 to 74, 
falling over the period from 34 percent of the population to 23 percent.  And many older adults 
in fair health are able to work.   
Figure 7 here 
Declines in Physical Job Demands.  The decline of the manufacturing sector over the past half 
century and the growing computerization of the workface also appear to have reduced the 
physical demands of work.  Here are several pieces of related evidence. 
First, between 1950 and 2000, the share of jobs in the goods-producing sector (which 
includes the construction and mining industries as well as manufacturing) fell from 41 percent to 
20 percent, and virtually all of the employment growth in the economy between 2000 and 2010 
is expected to come from the services-producing sector (Berman, 2001; Plunkert, 1990).  Most 
manufacturing jobs require more physical strength and endurance than the office work or retail 
sales that tends to characterize the services sector.  
Second, the share of older workers in jobs that almost never require much physical effort 
increased significantly in just a 10-year period.  The Health and Retirement Study (HRS), an 
ongoing government-funded survey of older Americans, asks respondents how often their jobs 
require lots of physical effort.  It also asks them how often they have to lift heavy loads and 
stoop, kneel, or crouch at work.  As shown in Figure 8, the share of workers ages 55 to 59 
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reporting that their jobs never or almost never involve these types of activities increased 
significantly between 1992 and 2002, and the percentages can be expected to increase in the 
future.   
Figure 8 here 
Third, research based on a more objective measure of job requirements found sharp 
declines in physical demands throughout the second half of the last century.  The Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (DOT) classifies and rates thousands of occupations on the basis of the type 
of work performed and its complexity.  Based on extensive on-site studies and information 
collected from trade and professional organizations, trained job analysts measured the level of 
strength required for each of more than 12,000 occupations.  By matching these occupations to 
workers in the Current Population Survey, researchers were able to measure changes over time in 
the share of workers in physically demanding jobs, based on the amount of heavy lifting that the 
jobs require.  By this measure, the share of workers in physically demanding jobs dropped from 
20 percent in 1950 to 7 percent in 1996 (see Figure 9).  
Figure 9 here 
Fourth, this combination of improvements in health and declines in the share of jobs in 
the economy that require substantial amounts of physical effort has reduced the share of older 
adults who claim they are unable to work.  Comparing data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Older Men and the Health and Retirement Study, we found that the share of men ages 
55 to 59 reporting health problems that limit the type or amount they can do fell over time, from 
27 percent in 1971 to 23 percent in 1992 to 20 percent in 2002 (see Figure 10).  
Finally, perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence on the ability to work at older 
ages comes from examining how much people were able to work in the past, when health status 
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was generally worse and jobs more physically demanding.  The relatively high employment rates 
among older men in the past implies that many people retire early today not because they are 
physically unable to work, but because they prefer to work less, their employers encourage them 
to retire, or the increasing generosity of government programs induces them to drop out of the 
labor force.  
Figure 10 here 
Figure 11 shows labor force participation rates from 1940 to 2001 for 65-year-old men 
and for men with about 16 years of remaining life expectancy (the life expectancy for 65-year-
old men in 2001).  In 1940, about two-thirds of 65-year-old men participated in the labor force, 
compared with 38 percent in 2001.  Measured by life expectancy, the drop was even greater.  
Between 1940 and 2001, for men with about 16 years of life expectancy, the participation rate 
fell from 86 percent to 38 percent.  Given improvements in health and reductions in the physical 
demands of work, these data provide compelling (although not definitive) evidence that the trend 
toward more and more years of retirement arises from such factors as the incentives embedded in 
public and private retirement programs, not from the inability of older adults to work.  
Figure 11 here 
Incentives Created by Employer-Sponsored Pension Plans 
What do the aging of the population and changes in the ability to work at older ages mean 
for employers?  Whether prodded by government policy or market demand for goods and 
services, Americans in late middle age, or perhaps early old age, will likely be meeting some of 
the future demand for workers, even though at one time their chronological age (rather than life 
expectancy) might have led society to define them as too “old” to work.  We have seen that 
people ages 55 to 74 could soon represent the largest pool of non-employed or underemployed 
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labor in the economy, even while most report being in fairly good health and jobs are less 
physically demanding than ever.  Employers, therefore, have incentives to provide compensation 
packages that attract older workers.  Pension and retirement benefits are key pieces of 
compensation that can play critical roles in encouraging workers to remain on the job. 
Traditional DB plans were once the dominant type of employer-sponsored pension plan.  
In 1980, for example, 63 percent of active participants in private plans belonged to DB plans, 
which accounted for 71 percent of all pension assets (U.S. Pension and Welfare Benefits 
Administration, 2001-2002).  However, growth in DB plans has stagnated over the past 20 years, 
while participation in 401(k) plans has soared.  As a result, in 1998 only 31 percent of active 
pension plan participants in the private sector belonged to DB plans, which accounted for fewer 
than half of all pension assets (although DB plans still dominate among large unionized 
employers and in the public sector).  In addition, a growing number of DB plans are now cash 
balance plans and pension equity plans, hybrids that combine features of traditional DB plans 
and DC plans (but are still considered to be DB plans for legal and regulatory purposes).  
The erosion of traditional DB coverage concerns some pension advocates, who fear that 
that it threatens retirement security.  Whereas DB plans guarantee fixed retirement benefits 
insured partly by the federal government, balances in DC accounts depend on uncertain market 
returns and the discipline of workers to set part of their paychecks aside each month for 
retirement savings.  To secure lucrative retirement benefits, DC participants must also make wise 
investment decisions, rollover their balances into other retirement savings accounts when they 
leave their employers before retirement, and carefully manage their balances after they retire, 
because few DC participants convert their balances into life annuities (Burman, Johnson, and 
Kobes, 2003).   
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The growing number of firms converting their traditional DB plans to hybrid plans has 
also generated controversy.  Hybrid plans are viewed by some as attempts by employers to 
renege on past DB pension promises in order to cut costs, and a federal court has ruled that 
IBM’s cash balance plan discriminates against older workers, who have fewer years of 
accumulation for a given effective deposit than younger workers (Cooper v. IBM Personal 
Pension Plan, No. 99-829-GPM (S.D. Ill. 2003)).   
But in many ways, DC and hybrid plans respond to the labor market conditions of the 
new century.  Unlike DB plans, they do not penalize workers who separate from their employers 
before reaching retirement age, and thus appeal to an increasingly mobile workforce (Farber 
1999).  And they do not penalize workers who remain with the employer past the plan’s 
retirement age, and thus lack the early retirement incentives inherent in many DB plans.  Nor do 
they necessarily penalize workers who join new firms after age 65.   
Measuring Retirement Incentives.  Pension accruals, the increase in pension wealth that results 
from an additional year of work, are common measures of the retirement incentives embedded in 
pension plans.  Pension wealth in traditional DB plans can be measured as the present discounted 
value of the stream of expected benefits.  In DC plans and hybrid plans, pension wealth simply 
equals the account balance.  Large positive rates of accrual create strong disincentives to retire, 
because pension wealth will grow substantially if workers remain on the job; small positive 
accrual rates and negative accrual rates create incentives to retire before pension wealth erodes.  
Traditional DB plans typically pay participants lifetime annuities that depend on years of 
service.  Some plans (usually multi-employer plans run by unions) pay benefits equal to a fixed 
amount per year of service.  Most DB plans, however, set benefits equal to a given percentage of 
earnings times the number of years of service.  Sometimes the earnings base is defined as 
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average pay received throughout the career; more commonly it is a measure of earnings received 
near the end of the career, such as average pay over the three highest-pay years with the 
employer.  Workers can start collecting benefits after they have separated from the employer and 
reached the plan’s retirement age.  If they leave beforehand, they typically have to wait until they 
reach retirement age to collect benefits, which are based on the nominal earnings received when 
they left the employer.  
Pension wealth tends to grow slowly in traditional DB plans for relatively young workers, 
increases rapidly once workers approach retirement age (or maximum years of countable 
service), and often declines if they remain with the employer beyond that age or time.  Pension 
accruals and wealth are also low at young ages because retirement benefits are discounted many 
years into the future for younger workers.  However, pension accruals in most traditional DB 
plans rise rapidly as workers age, because an additional year on the job increases pension 
benefits not only by adding an additional percentage of pay, but also by raising the value of all 
previous benefit accruals by a combination of real income growth and inflation.  This additional 
increment is often substantial for workers with lengthy job tenures.  Pension wealth also 
increases as workers approach retirement age and benefits are no longer discounted far into the 
future. 
Workers in traditional DB plans can lose pension wealth, however, if they stay on the job 
beyond a certain age or seniority level.  Growth in promised annual retirement benefits slows at 
older ages as wage growth declines.  Some plans also cap the number of years of service that 
workers can credit toward their pensions, and others cap the share of pre-retirement earnings that 
the plan will replace in retirement.  In addition, for every year that workers remain on the job 
past the plan’s retirement age, they forego a year of retirement benefits.  Accruals turn negative 
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when the increase in annual benefits from an additional year of work is insufficient to offset the 
reduction in the number of pension installments. 
Many traditional DB plans include early retirement incentives.  These provisions allow 
workers to collect reduced benefits before they qualify for full benefits at later ages.  Annual 
benefits received through these plan provisions are lower than those received at the normal 
retirement age because they are paid earlier (so that one dollar in early retirement benefits has a 
higher present value than one dollar in normal retirement benefits) and because early retirees 
receive more pension installments than those who retire later.  However, in many plans the 
reduction in benefits for early retirement is insufficient to offset fully the additional pension 
installments and the diminished effects of discounting.  As a result, many workers in traditional 
DB plans can maximize pension wealth by retiring at relatively young ages.  These provisions 
may have made sense to employers a few decades ago when the labor pool included many 
relatively inexpensive younger workers who could replace their more expensive senior 
counterparts, but not today when younger workers are in short supply. 
The retirement incentives created by DC plans and hybrid plans generally differ markedly 
from those created by traditional DB plans.  In DC plans, the increment to pension wealth 
associated with an additional year of work equals employer contributions to the DC account.  
(Pension accruals exclude investment income, which can continue to accrue after the worker 
separates from the employer.)  Most firms offering DC plans contribute a fixed percentage of the 
worker’s salary to the plan account; only 4 percent of full-time workers in private-sector DC 
plans belong to plans that explicit vary employer contribution rates by years of service (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2003b).  However, many employers match a portion of the worker’s 
contributions, which tend to increase with age.  Thus, pension accruals in some DC plans 
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increase with age, but not as dramatically as in traditional DB plans.  And although poor 
investment returns can shrink the value of DC accounts, accruals in DC plans associated with an 
additional year of work are never negative.   
Pension accruals in hybrid plans are also much flatter than in traditional DB plans.  In 
cash balance plans, the accrual equals the pay credit rate times salary (as long as the interest 
credit rate is approximately equal to the rate that workers could earn on their balances if they left 
the firm and invested the funds on their own).  However, unlike traditional DB plans, past vested 
benefits typically increase over time with interest regardless of whether the employee stays on 
the job or not.  Accrual profiles do tend to be somewhat steeper in plans that increase pay credit 
rates with years of service, which is fairly common (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000).  
Nonetheless, these accrual profiles are smoother in cash balance plans than typical traditional DB 
plans.  Cash balance plans do not exhibit the spikes in pension wealth that often characterize 
traditional DB plans, and accruals in cash balance plans are always greater than zero for vested 
workers, except for some workers who were already participating in the plan when it converted 
from the traditional DB format.  In general, transition effects—including this issue of whether 
economic accumulation is or should be allowed initially after conversion until a so-called “wear-
away” effect ends—is not addressed in this paper.   
Wealth in pension equity plans grows over time as workers accumulate pay credits and 
salaries rise.  As in cash balance plans, pay credit rates in these plans often increase with age or 
years of service (Allen et al., 2003).  However, active plan participants do not earn interest on 
their accumulated balances.  The opportunity cost of remaining with the employer, in terms of 
foregone investment earnings, increases over time as the balance grows.  For plans in which the 
pay credit rate does not increase with tenure, accrual rates will fall over time (and could 
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eventually become negative) if the growth rate in salaries falls short of the interest rate that 
participants could earn on their balances after they separate from the employer.   
Figure 12 compares pension accruals by age in traditional DB plans in the private sector 
and prototypical hybrid plans.  The graph presents pension accruals as a percentage of the annual 
wage.  All of the accruals shown in the figure are based on a common set of assumptions.  The 
estimates assume that workers join the employer at age 25 and that wages grow at the average 
rate among college-educated men in DB plans, as reported in Toder et al. (2002).  The annual 
growth rate in wages is about equal to 5 percent for workers in their late 20s, 3 percent for 
workers in their late 30s, and less than 2 percent for workers in their 50s.  The analysis uses a 
real interest rate of 3 percent and an inflation rate of 4 percent.  
Figure 12 here 
Estimates for traditional DB plans are based on the Pension Insurance Modeling System 
(PIMS).  PIMS is a simulation model developed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a 
federal corporation that insures DB plans.  It includes information on about 600 single-employer 
plans in the private sector.  Although the dataset include a wide range of plans currently in use, it  
does not contain any multiemployer plans and very few plans from small employers.  As a result, 
these plans are somewhat more generous than the average DB plan.1   
Accrual profiles in cash balance and pension equity plans are based on prototypical plans.  
The cash balance plan estimates assume an interest credit rate of 7 percent and pay credit rates 
that rise with years in service.  Pay credits are set equal to 3.2 percent of salary for years 1 to 5, 
4.8 percent for years 6 to 10, 6.4 percent for years 11 to 20, and 8.0 percent after year 20.  These 
pay credit rates are equal to the average rate that cash balance plans would pay to provide 
benefits about as generous as traditional DB plans (Johnson and Uccello, 2003).  The pension 
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equity plan defines final average pay as mean annual salary over the last five years of 
employment.  Pay credit rates in the pension equity plan also increase with years of service.  We 
set them at 2.6 percent for years 1 to 5, 3, 8 percent for years 6 to 10, 5.1 percent for years 11 to 
20, and 6.4 percent after years 20.  This pension equity plan generates about the same level of 
pension wealth as the cash balance plan at age 60 (for workers with identical earnings histories 
who join the plans at age 25).   
As shown in Figure 12, pension accruals in traditional DB plans are minimal at young 
ages, grow rapidly in the late 40s and 50s as workers approach retirement age, and then become 
negative as workers lose pension wealth when they remain at work past the plan’s retirement 
age.  For workers in their early 60s who have participated in the DB plan since age 25, for 
example, pension wealth declines on average by about 14 percent of annual salary each year.  
These sharp drops in pension wealth provide strong incentives to retire.  By contrast, the 
prototypical hybrid plans we modeled reward work at older ages.  In both the cash balance plan 
and the pension equity plan, accruals as a share of annual salary increase gradually over the 
career, because these prototypical plans tie pay credit rates to years of service.   
But pension equity plans do not always reward work at older ages.  In some plans, for 
example, pay credit rates are uniform throughout the career, instead of increasing with years of 
service as in the prototypical plan we modeled.  In these plans, pension accrual rates would 
decline slowly over time, as the opportunity cost of foregone investment income on the account 
balance grows.  Accruals can even become negative in pension equity plans if the account 
balance is large, interest rates are high, and salaries grow relatively slowly, providing workers 
with strong incentives to retire.  Thus, the specifics of the plan design, not just the plan format, 
play important roles in creating incentives to remain at work at older ages.  In cash balance 
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plans, by contrast, accrual rates are never negative, even if the pay credit rates do not grow with 
years of service, because the account balance earns interest at approximately the same rate 
whether the participants remain with the employer or leave.   
Another shortcoming of traditional DB plans in promoting work at older ages is that they 
often provide little incentive for older workers to join new employers after leaving one job for 
voluntary or involuntary reasons.  Accrual rates in the years immediately following vesting are 
often quite large in traditional plans for workers hired a few years before the plan’s normal 
retirement age, because benefits are not discounted far into the future.  But accrual rates drop 
sharply after the normal retirement age.  For those hired after age 65, accrual rates in traditional 
plans are often minimal, because each additional year of work reduces the length of the stream of 
annuity benefits.  In cash balance and pension equity plans, by contrast, accrual rates generally 
do not vary by age at hire, because the value of retirement benefits do not depend on life 
expectancy at retirement.  Hybrid plans, then, generally provide workers with stronger incentives 
to join employers at older ages than traditional plans. 
Conclusion 
As the population ages and young workers become increasingly scarce, employers are 
now searching for ways to increase labor supply among older adults.  They can no longer turn to 
the surge of baby boomers entering the market or the rising tide of female employment to meet 
the demand for labor.  Given improvements in health status and declines in physical job 
demands, many Americans are able to work until late in life.  Most, however, choose not to work 
beyond their early 60s, instead spending almost one-third of their adult lives in retirement.  In 
addition to limiting the pool of workers available to produce the goods and services necessary to 
keep the economy growing rapidly, low employment rates at older ages reduce the tax revenue 
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needed to finance government services, including retirement programs, and increase the burden 
on younger workers who must support the retired population.  
A number of factors contribute to the reluctance of older adults to remain in the labor 
force, including the presence of generous public and private retirement systems that allow many 
seniors to live comfortably without having to work for pay, outmoded laws that make it difficult 
for people to collect retirement benefits while working part-time (which many older adults prefer 
to full-time work), and social mores stipulating that careers end by age 60 to 65.  Traditional DB 
pension plans also discourage work at older ages.  Many of these plans subsidize benefits for 
those who retire early, often as young as age 55, or, put differently, penalize work past that age.  
And most plan participants lose lifetime pension benefits by remaining at work past the age at 
which they can first receive full benefits, because the boost in annual benefits that comes from 
working an additional year is typically not large enough to offset the year of lost payments.  As a 
result, workers with DB plans retire about two years earlier, on average, than otherwise identical 
workers with DC plans (Friedberg and Webb, 2003), which do not include feature these work 
disincentives.  Although DB plans have been declining in popularity over the past two decades, 
they continue to enroll a sizeable share of the workforce, and they remain the dominant type of 
retirement plan offered in the public sector and among large unionized employers.  
The incentive structure of traditional DB plans is quite unusual.  In typical DB plans, the 
value of working an additional year, in terms of lifetime pension benefits, resembles a hill-
shaped curve, with few benefits at the beginning or end, but very large economic accruals in 
middle years.  To accumulate substantial retirement benefits, workers generally have to stay on 
the job for a long time, and employers are able to keep the costs of DB plans down because the 
plans impose heavy penalties on workers who separate before the age of retirement.  Many 
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workers, who are becoming increasingly mobile and change jobs multiple times over the course 
of their careers, are unlikely to accrue much pension wealth in traditional DB plans.  In effect, 
DB plans favor a select group of longer-term employees, often in late middle-age, but disfavor 
both younger and older workers. 
Unlike traditional DB plans, hybrid pension plans, such as cash balance plans and 
pension equity plans, often reward work at older ages at least as much as work at younger ages, 
because workers in hybrid plans do not forego a year of benefits for every year that they remain 
on the job past the retirement age.  Instead, their account balances continues to grow as long as 
they remain at work.  And hybrid plans generally do not subsidize workers who elect to retire 
early.  Although these plans have been a source of continuing controversy in recent years, they 
appear to be one response—among many—to the new demographics of the labor market, in 
which older individuals will become the largest source of potential labor in the economy.   
We are not suggesting, however, that the newer types of hybrid plans are the only, or 
even necessarily the best, means of adapting any particular employer’s pension plan to meet the 
new demands of the labor force.  DB plans might be reformed in other ways, such as indexing 
benefits from the time that the worker leaves the job, much as hybrid plans provide an interest 
rate return on prior accumulations.  Employers can also eliminate early retirement provisions 
from DB plans that subsidize workers who retire at young ages.  Government or private policy 
might allow newer types of DC plans to be offered to workers with more traditional DB plans 
who stay on the job after reaching some plan retirement age.  Moreover, adoption of a hybrid 
plan format does not guarantee a retirement plan that provides strong work incentives at older 
ages.  Pension equity plans, in particular, can include features that actually encourage early 
retirement.  For example, if pay credits do not increase fast enough with years of service, and 
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salaries rise slowly or not at all, participants might be able to increase their retirement savings by 
leaving the employer and investing the account balance themselves than by remaining in the 
plan.  And pension equity plans that tie benefits to final average salary may discourage older 
workers who prefer to reduce their hours and earnings from remaining on the job.  Design 
features require careful scrutiny as employers come to terms with the new realities of the labor 
market.   
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Figure 1.  Age Distribution of the Adult U.S. Population, 1950-2050
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Figure 2.  Labor Force Participation Rates by Age and Gender, 1950-2000
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Figure 3.  Labor Force Participation Rates, Adults Ages 20+, 1950-2050
(Assuming 2000 Rates by Age and Gender Continue)
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Figure 4.  Number of Workers Per Adults Ages 65+ Not in Labor Force
(Assuming 2000 Labor Force Participation Rates by Age and Gender Continue)
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Figure 5.  Size of Adult population Not in the Labor Force, 1950-2000
(Assuming 2000 Labor Force Participation Rates by Age and Gender Continue) 
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Figure 6. Number of Workers 18+ Per Adults Ages 65+ Not in Labor Force, 2000 and 2020,
Under Alternative Assumptions About Participation Rates for Men Ages 55+
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Figure 7.  Share of Older Adults Reporting Fair or Poor Health, 1982-2001
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Figure 8.  Job Requirements of Workers Ages 55-60, 1992 and 2002
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Figure 9.  Share of U.S. Workers in Physically Demanding Jobs
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Figure 10.  Share of Men Ages 55-59 with Work Limitation, 1971, 1992, 2002
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Figure 11.  Male Labor Force Participation Rates, 1940-2001
-
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
S
h
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
F
o
r
c
e
Men with 16.4 years of life expectancy
Men age 65
Age 58.5 in 1940
Early retirement 
available Medicare introduced in 1966
Age 65 in 2001 
(under both measures) 
Source:  Updated from Steuerle and Spiro (1999).
  
12
 
Figure 12.  Average Accrual in Traditional DB Plans and Hybrid Plans
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